Why did the Russian March die?

Preparation for the “Russian March - 2018” broke the record for the lack of any public interest in this event. And he would have been even less if it had not been for the 2-year-old eighth-grade adolescent 14 November arrest in Moscow, who was a comrade-in-arms bomber from Arkhangelsk, on suspicion of making a bomb, which he allegedly intended to blow up on the march in Lyublino.

The intelligence services and society suddenly, to their deep surprise, found that, it turns out, not Russian nationalists, even the most radical, present a terrorist danger in modern Russia, but left-wing anarchists, like some kind of old unkind 120 years ago. The rightists, on the other hand, may turn out to be the natural casualties for these terrorists.

There is no paradox here, however. In fact, nationalists in a minimally adequately organized society constitute the main protective force, the main pivot of order, and if they overflow (sometimes sometimes very far), then they are in a counter-wave of opposition to the storming of society by radical anti-national, globalist, leftist forces.

It was this wave of waves that gave birth to the Russian March in 2005.

Let me remind you that shortly before him, in December 2004, the first Ukrainian Maidan died down. For the first time, Russian elites and society are faced with the likelihood of "color revolutions." Small but noisy clones of the international color movement, represented by the Serbian Otpor, the Georgian Kmara, and the Ukrainian Poroy, began to thrive in the capitals with a painfully equal fist on the emblem.

There was a feeling that a similar Kiev circus would soon begin in Russia. And consequently, the demand for active security has grown.

Its official branch was represented by all sorts of "Ours" and their counterparts - "pro-Kremlin youth movements," as they said then. These movements had a powerful organizational structure, tens of thousands of volunteers and funding. One problem - they had too many careerists, mostly unprincipled, at best - vague general industrialists. A feature of color revolutions is the destruction by non-violent methods of all the structures of the state apparatus and its will to actively resist the revolutionaries. In other words, the “careerist” in resisting such a revolution was absolutely useless, as he would betray at least in order to please the new authorities.

In order to seriously hope that at the appointed hour of the revolution someone would come to the square to really say no to them, these people who came out had to have ideas for which they are ready to fight and with which the potential revolution is like a knife into their throats.

There were not so many such active groups in Russia of that time - they were leftist patriots of a neo-Stalinist persuasion. And it was the right - Orthodox conservatives, Eurasians and nationalists from moderate intellectuals to rather radical fighters against illegal migration, among whom there were still many guys in berets, with shaved heads and masks on their faces (later this westernized fashion completely, fortunately, disappeared) .

In order to symbolize the existence of this trend, its readiness to enter the square and its contradiction on the liberal-revolutionary agenda, the bold decision was made for the bureaucracy of that time to allow the Right March to be held in the center of Moscow, organized by the Dugan “Eurasian Youth Union” ( ECM).

Pavel Zarifullin

As far as it was a nationalist organization, says the fact that it was then headed by the mystical Eurasian Pavel Zarifullin, who was the leader of the first organizing committee of the “march”, and the late Vladimir Karpets, always distinguished by extreme hostility to Russian nationalism, held a banner with the inscription:

However, the ECM’s own resources for a representative procession were not enough, and therefore the Duginians concluded a pact with the DPNI * Belova-Potkin, the NDPR Alexander Sevastyanova, RONS * Igor Artyomov, small organizations like ROD, headed by Konstantin Krylov, Natalia Kholmogorova and as supported by me. , then worked as a columnist for Radio “Mayak” and was listed as a candidate for the Moscow City Duma from a completely pointless spoiler party (however, the crust was quite real).

Of these allies, only the DPNI * possessed some mass character, however, it was enough that the authorities did not interfere in any way either with agitation or gathering participants. The information resources of the nationalists were quite enough to attract the masses of poorly organized people and football fans who were not officially phratries, but as individuals. In agitation, the dull “Right March” was almost immediately replaced by the combat “Russian March”, the DPNI * hired a group of drummers, which gave the whole action an additional stylistic appeal.

On the eve of the march, the nationalist and Eurasian parts of the organizing committee quarreled (without which no attempt at organizing socio-political activity can do), and therefore, waking up on November 4 in the morning of November 2005, I sincerely planned not to go to "another meaningless event."

However, the circumstances were such that I not only went to him, but also found myself at the head of the columns. On the approach to the framework of metal detectors at the monument to Griboyedov, I was met by a well-known Orthodox activist, Kirill Frolov, and with a gesture not objectionable, handed over the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God - in honor of which the holiday was established in 2004 on the initiative of Metropolitan Kirill on National Unity Day. As a person attentive to the agiopolitical symbolism and signs, I obediently accepted this icon and stood at the head of the column, before the ECM, as they say - where they were told, thus being the first victim of crowded journalists.

In this form, with an icon in his hands, the author of these lines and got into the modern history of Russia, which is recorded in the volume “The other day. Our era. 2001 – 2005 ”, where for some reason my photo was placed in the article“ Russian March ”.

The success of the march is incredibly promoted by two circumstances. The first is the great weather on this day. A significant number of people of varying degrees of moderation of Russian views learned about the event from social networks, and the good weather and the unprohibited status of the event prompted them to come. In fact, these people were five thousand, hardly more. However, the route from Chisty Prudy to China-town forced the columns to stretch along the boulevards, and therefore the march seemed endless.

The second is the atmosphere of hysteria, which from the very first second began to escalate the liberal media around the march. They sent dozens of correspondents there instructing them to photograph “zigi” (hunting for “zigi” has since become the main entertainment of liberal journalists in the days of Russian marches). The leftist extremists intended to “disrupt” the march, throwing it with firecrackers, which frightened only the young drummers.

The main danger was, of course, that the skins would start beating the leftists after the next bang, riot police would intervene, someone very smart brought from somewhere in the Asian part of the Russian Federation ... But everything worked out.

The combination of the sun, the historical center of Moscow, a sense of its own population, a sense of danger and at the same time law-abiding (yet officially allowed) created the indescribable feeling of drive that never repeated on subsequent marches.

And it was supplemented by the heart-rending screech of the liberal media, which signaled to both the nationalists themselves and the political establishment that “these are afraid of us.” If it were not for the fact that some nationalist groups, for example, Demushkin and his comrades, did not notice the frank work on these media, expressed in artistic posing with “zigs,” everything could have been considered successful.

It must be remembered that in 2005, nationalism was viewed by both the government and society as a completely illegitimate ideology.

Nationalists were considered a priori as “fascists,” who are generally outside the realm of imaginary public consensus. Therefore, by indicating “Look, these are Natsik!” The journalists expected to provoke mass repressions against us.

But in reality, this hysteria played a cruel joke on the liberals - they presented the nationalists with a stronger and more organized group than we really were. Since there was a strong hidden request for strong nationalism in Russian society, the heart-rending cries about the “coming fascists” and the photo of skinheads provoked a reaction, the opposite of what was supposed to be - many people said: “Finally”.

It was hysteria in the media where, to a greater extent than the very fact of passing the columns, changed the political configuration.

It was recognized that there is an official society in society, there are communists (then influential, but dull) and a little bit of any leftists, there are liberals who want Maidan, and there are nationalists who, maybe, want something not Maidan. And with the nationalists, too, must be considered. This was the corridor of ideological possibilities with which it was possible (and needed) to work.

Unfortunately, most nationalists did something else instead. Namely,

at first they imagined that now the power would come to them to bow and “claim” them, and then they were terribly offended when such a call was not made.

The political strategist Stanislav Belkovsky began to “graze” the top of our nationalist community with extraordinary density. He decided to turn the nationalists into a ram gun in the attack on the Kremlin, which did not claim its services.

In a short time, Belkovsky developed an ideology of "anti-Putin nationalism." At one time, even the most successful project of Belkovsky, Navalny, put on makeup under a nationalist. As far as Belkovsky was a “Russian nationalist,” his statement on 2014 of the year showed when he called on the US to launch a nuclear attack on Sevastopol.

The enchantment of this siren had quite tragic consequences for Russian nationalism - in fact, it was shot down on takeoff. First, the nationalists banally quarreled among themselves - the national opposition with the national statesmen and patriots. Secondly, the national opposition descended from the most natural for themselves at that time critical rails to the authorities, but fundamentally the state power, turned into “enemies of the state” both in the eyes of the bureaucracy and in their own.

The anti-national guards began to develop with his myth “Russian Maidan”, which was especially actively exploited by Kurginyan’s followers - this myth caused enormous damage to Russian nationalism.

Thirdly, this shift has led to serious ideological and psychological mutations. A kind of culture of hatred towards the Russian state and all who dare not treat it as an enemy began to take shape among the nat oppositionists, and historical and political theories fitted to this conclusion were formulated.

Finally, fourth, for the personal development of the majority of nationalists as public figures, the “belching” turned out to be a terrible obstacle - some were imprisoned or under the article, others received the stigma of disloyalty for many years, and their career slowed down.

The author of these lines, who has always been the most decisive opponent of this absurd deviation, has been unbridled for many years, demanding that he repent for "Putinism."

All these years, the “Russian march” mutated from a demonstration of strength into a demonstration of weakness - it was officially banned and it turned into a dangerous event, its number stagnated and was insignificant. Then they stopped pressing it, but they forced it out of Moscow to the outskirts - in Lyublino. The number of marchers increased markedly, but this was due to the “navalists,” who followed the strategy of their leader at the time to combine nationalist slogans with liberal ones.

Characteristically, the loudest street performances with a nationalist color in Moscow did not fit the Russian March agenda and were not associated with the organizations that conducted it - these were protests against ethno-criminal on Manezh Square in December 2010 and in Biryulyovo in October 2013 th

And here and there, the “marches” were absolutely irrelevant. Both here and there, the authorities in one way or another listened to the protests precisely because they included people, not “marching” elements. In other words, the “marching” nationalism turned out to be driven into a certain subcultural pen. They were not even “all nationalists”, but only “nationalists of the“ Russian march ”.

The moment of truth came in 2014, when the march movement, in fact, split into Russian nationalists, who supported Novorossia, and ultra-right neo-Nazis, who supported the “Aryan brothers of Ukraine”. Attempts by representatives of the two directions to go together with success was not crowned, the Russian Marches brand remained mostly for pro-Ukrainians (although, for example, Savelieva is arguing “Great Russia”).

There were so many “Russian marches” that I simply didn’t want to go at least to one of them.

In fact, the ten-year history of the Russian March was a history of forced attempts to repeat the success of 2005 of the year. However, since this success itself was mostly a media phantom, a product of social networks and liberal hysteria, the second success of the projectile hit the same funnel was almost incredible.

The “Russian march” as a manifestation of strong Russian nationalism, which forces one to reckon with oneself, happened more than once, but only in other places and other forms - and with other people.

When in December 2010, violent youth forced the state to pay attention to the problem of ethno-criminal - it was a real Russian march. When in February 2014, Russian people with Russian flags marched through Sevastopol and Odessa - the first, as it turned out, to win, and the second to burn, it was a Russian march. And when the militia entered Debaltseve-it was the Russian march.

Fortunately, the errors of the “Marshevik” could not seriously damage the formation of the Russian national consciousness and in society, in the media, and among elites, including the president. It was a natural historical process associated with the restoration of the normality of Russia itself and the Russians themselves, and with the world trend for nationalism.

In a world where right-wing and far-right nationalists are gaining more and more weight in a parliamentary way, where the extreme nationalist Narendra Modi heads the second (almost the first) country by population, Russia has long been moderately lagging behind in the implementation of public demand for nationalism.

And this delay, alas, was caused not only by the inertness of the bureaucracy, but also by the inadequacy of the ideas and political practice of the nationalists themselves, who for some reason became global musicians for the dancers in the destruction of the Russian state, and even the Ukrainians ... in the cause of the Russians (the last is wild ).

The central idea of ​​any nationalism is the idea of ​​a national state, a state that protects a certain nation. For a state to be national, it must be a state.

* An organization in respect of which the court made the decision on liquidation or prohibition of activity that has entered into legal force on the grounds provided for by the Federal Law "On Countering Extremist Activities".

Source

Yegor Kholmogorov

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